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CALGARY AND EVERYTHING AFTER:
A POSTMODERN RE-VISION OF LAWYERING
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
Hutchinson encourages a re-thinking of the ethics
of lawyering. He explores the need to transform
through legal theory what is done in legal practice
and what is justified to be left undone. This
exploration begins with a discussion of the
traditional image of the ethical lawyer. He then
exposes this image to a series of critiques and
introduces alternate models of legal practice. A
postmodern vision of lawyering is introduced which
reframes and reworks these traditional ways of
thinking. By the adoption of such a postmodern re-
vision of lawyering, change in legal practice may
come about through the legal profession, rather
than in spite of it.
Hutchinson propose de repenser lthique du
barreau. Il explore la ndcessitd de transformer par
le biais de la thdorie du droit ce qui se fait dans la
pratique du droit et ce dont il convient de
s'abstenir. Cette exploration commence par une
discussion portant sur l'image traditionnelle de
lavocat respectueux de l'ethique. La discussion se
poursuit dans le contexte des critiques de ce moddle
et d'autres modiles possibles. I propose une vision
postmoderne du barreau qui transcende ces modes
de pensde conventionnels. Cette vision postmoderne
rivisde permettra peut-etre que lapratiquejuridique
ivolue grdice 6 la profession et non pas en ddpit
d'elle.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much to my teenaged daughters' chagrin, I listen to and enjoy some of the same
music as they do - "But if you like it, it can't be much good." One of the best new
bands around is Counting Crows. Inspired by singer-songwriter Adam Duritz, their
music is melodic grunge, their lyrics full of irony and angst. In a song about a disturbed
girlfriend, there is a verse that ends with the lines "Around here we talk just like lions\
But we sacrifice like lambs."' Listening to this gave me a suitable text through which
to set the thematic structure of my talk and to establish an appropriate postmodem
posture. To be blunt, this paper is about how lawyers can talk the talk and walk the
walk, but, when they are put to the test, their talk is often empty and their walk is
usually all show. Instead of the lion it roars itself to be, the legal profession as a whole
is a sorry flock of establishment sheep.
In a jurisprudential manner of speaking, I want to roam with the lions and run the
theoretical risk of ending up in the belly of the beast, in order to avoid the practical fate
of simply lying down with the sheep and falling politically asleep. In taking this defiant
stance, my talk will draw on and continue a large and ambitious project that I have
been engaged in, although not always by design, for some years: trying to understand
and transform through legal theory what we do in our routine practices as lawyers, law
professors and law students. In a very real sense, this discussion is a companion piece
to Wes Pue's wonderful historical essay on the legal profession's myth-making. By
Associate Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. This essay
is a lightly edited version of a talk that I gave at the Calgary Conference. Many thanks to Adam
Bernstein, Richard Devlin, Pam Marshall, Wendy Rambo and Jim Smith for their assistance and
encouragement.
"Around Here" on Counting Crows, August and Everything After (1994).
2 W.W. Pue, "In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers' Histories and Histories of Lawyers" (1995) 33
Alta. L. Rev. 730.
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drawing on a more theoretical set of materials, I hope to elucidate critically the kind
of image that we have of ourselves as lawyers and how important that image is in
informing what we do, how we justify what we do not do, and what we might become.
It as much through the attachment to these blurry and impoverished visions as anything
else that lawyers continue to follow the flocking sheep rather than lead as prideful
lions.
Law and lawyering seems full of oxymorons. In the popular imagination, the most
prominent of these is the notion of "legal ethics." For many, it is a contradiction in
terms to talk about lawyering and ethical standards of behaviour in the same breath:
lawyers are on a par with pariahs, not paragons. Indeed, some go so far as to suggest
that to be a lawyer is to vacate the ordinary domain of ethical judgement and to inhabit
a perverse world of normative disingenuity. In spite of (or perhaps because of) this
common understanding, it is imperative to take on the task of re-thinking the ethics of
lawyering. As the legal profession's status grows in terms of power and influence in
public and private life,3 so too does the need to construct a re-vision of ethical
lawyering that is consonant with its contemporary socio-economic organization and
political responsibilities in a society that still, at least nominally, pays lip-service to the
ideals of democratic governance and accountability. This challenge is particularly acute
in the provision of available and appropriate legal representation to the least advantaged
and most disenfranchised in society. Is there a sound and viable vision of what it is to
engage in ethical lawyering for poor people? Is it really possible to remain a lawyer and
be truly radical? Is the idea of ethical and radical lawyering merely oxymoronic in its
expression or actually moronic in its aspiration?
By way of suggesting an intellectual framework within which to comprehend and
address these pressing conundrums, I want to introduce the insights and injunctions of
a postmodern way of proceeding. Again, for many, this will be heaving one more
oxymoron into the already overcrowded space for thinking about legal practice. Insofar
as it has any common currency and popular understanding, postmodernism is seen to
be the very antithesis of a way of proceeding anywhere at all - more an indulgent
wringing of anguished hands than a useful guide for practical action. As such, it might
be thought to be the last thing that lawyers or their critics need to extricate the
profession from its practical predicament of institutional (il)legitimacy. Nonetheless, I
believe that a postmodern re-visioning of lawyering represents the best hope for the
ethical renascence and political empowerment of legal practice in a contemporary
democratic culture: it is the most effective and viable theoretical resource in a radical
project of transformative politics. Concerns about the indefinite intimations of a
postmodern strategy are understandable, but misplaced: there is no necessary
contradiction between theoretical loyalty to a postmodem perspective and the practical
implementation of a radical political agenda.4 While it does not provide the ground for
See H. Arthurs, R. Weisman & F. Zemans, "Canadian Lawyers: A Peculiar Professionalism" in
R. Abel & P. Lewis, eds., Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1988).
Contra A. Hunt, "The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodernism" (1990) 35 McGill L.J. 507; and
G. Binder, "What's Left" (1991) 69 Texas L. Rev. 1985.
progressive politics, postmodernism does constitute a complementary strategy. The
progressive postmodernist and radical lawyer is not the oxymoronic character that the
left rejects for its perceived conservatism and that the right fears for its assumed
nihilism.
Rather than begin with an elaborate and abstract account of postmodern thinking, I
will introduce postmodern premises and lines of argument in a suitably postmodern
fashion - within the context of the implicit jurisprudential assumptions about law that
underlie those regnant models of lawyering that themselves inform and inspire the daily
routines and regularized decision-making of professional practitioners. Accordingly, the
second section sketches and criticizes the traditional image and defence of the ethical
lawyer. The third part looks at critical efforts to ameliorate the deficiencies of that
traditional model. Although useful, such efforts remain very beholden to the mainstream
assumptions and parameters of conventional lawyering. The fourth section responds to
those progressive detractors who maintain that the image of an ethical lawyer or a
radical lawyer is unavoidably perverse; lawyers are always part of the problem, never
a component in the solution. While the fifth section introduces a postmodern way of
thinking, the sixth part sketches a reconstructed vision of postmodern lawyering. The
seventh section explores its implications for resolving persistent problems in the ethical
practice of radical lawyering.' This short article amounts to a preliminary meditation
on what it might mean to act radically and ethically in a world in which notions of
what counts as radical or ethical are always contested and contestable, and, particularly,
what it might mean to do so as a lawyer.
II. THE TRADITIONAL IMAGE OF THE ETHICAL LAWYER
The traditional image of the ethical lawyer has remained largely static and unchanged
for many decades. Although it has received considerable maintenance work by way of
renovation and redecoration, the basic structure and foundations remain much the same.
Caricatured as "hired guns," the more serious core of the traditional image is that of
lawyers as hired hands. Little needs to be said of this image, for it remains the
operating model through which lawyers are trained, under which most lawyers function
and which is formally sanctioned by the provincial law societies. However, despite a
lengthy and impressive historical pedigree, this model is very much a modernist one in
the sense that it is based on a confidence in certain foundational assumptions, processes
and values about law, society and ways of thinking about them.
The traditional image of lawyering is centred on the idea that lawyers are super-
technocrats; they possess a special set of talents and techniques which they deploy for
the advantage of those people who hire them. They regard themselves as being neutral
This essay owes a very great deal to the insightful and important work of Anthony Alfieri. In a
series of articles, he has offered both a powerful critique of traditional lawyering and a
constructive alternative for transformative lawyering. I borrow unashamedly and extensively from
his exposition of a theoretics of legal practice that promotes a vision of poverty law advocacy as
a form of and forum for community education, local organization and political mobilization. See
A. Alfieri, "Impoverished Practices" (1993) 81 Geo. L.J. 2567; and A. Alfieri, "Reconstructive
Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative" (1991) 100 Yale L.J. 2107.
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on the substance and form of the law; their task is very much to apply the law, a little
to criticize it, but most certainly not to make it. The lawyer-as-hired-hand's
commitment is to the legal system which, even when they are working around and
within it, must be accepted as a given. If lawyers have a larger social calling, it is "to
achieve the moral integration of [their] clients into the social order."6 Almost
indifferent to who their clients are, lawyers think of themselves as more chosen than
choosing. The relationship between lawyer and client is built upon trust and respect:
clients are to trust lawyers to act in the clients' best interests and, in return, lawyers
will respect the clients' autonomy. It is not for lawyers to impinge upon that autonomy,
but to act on behalf of the client to realize their interests and inspirations. Indeed,
clients tend to be fungible. While it is recognized that richer and poorer clients will
have different problems because of their wealth and that the appropriate strategies to
be followed will be tailored to the particular client's needs and demands, they are
entitled to equal access to the legal process. The lawyer-as-hired-hand treats all clients
exactly the same, in the sense that they are each citizens who have had their rights
infringed and want relief or vindication. Advocacy and action tends, therefore, to be
standardized and made routine. Insofar as lawyers and clients are from different cultures
and classes, lawyers are expected to bridge the gap by personal empathy and
professional solidarity.
The fact that this traditional image still has great currency in the legal profession has
much to do with the equally traditional theory of law from which it draws its shape and
justification. For better or worse, the hallmark of good lawyers is considered to be their
cultivation of rule-craft: the ability and possibility of identifying the extant rules of the
legal system and applying them to particular situations. The central article of faith of
this ultra-Hartian positivism is that rules are the basic currency of legal transactions and
that their application can be performed in a professional and objective way. If not quite
"the brooding omnipresence in the sky,' 7 law is an imposing and imposed structure that
has considerable stability, that is operationally determinate in the guidance that it
extends to the trained lawyer, and that is institutionally distinct from the more open-
minded disputations around ideological politics. As such, the image of the lawyer-as-
hired-hand embraces the idea that the law has a life of its own and is not influenced by
the lawyers or legal officials who engage in the system. In this sense, any legal practice
that craves and expects professional recognition must be seen to take law seriously and
serve clients' interests through the extant rules, procedures and venues of law: overt
politicization is severely frowned upon. It is a proud, unapologetic and loyal defence
of The Rule of Law.
As attractive and as comforting as this image of lawyer-as-hired-hand may be to
legal practitioners, its problems are manifest and manifold. It fails theoretically,
empirically and ideologically: it is based upon a formalistic theory of law that is largely
discredited and defunct as a serious attempt to understand law and its operation; it
describes a version of legal practice that no longer has any empirical validity or
historical accuracy, if it ever did; and it defends both its informing theory and
6 Alfieri, "Impoverished Practices," ibid. at 2603.
7 South Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 at 222 (1917), Holmes J.
governing practice of lawyering as apolitical in a way that merely serves to underline
its very definite ideological commitments.
While mainstream jurisprudence continues to recognize an important role for rules
in a modem legal system, almost all jurists of any credibility or respectability accept
that the law is not as objective, stable or determinate as the image of lawyer-as-hired-
hand maintains. It is not that they have abandoned a commitment to The Rule of Law
and hold law to be irredeemably indeterminate, but that they hold that "law ... is deeply
and thoroughly political ... [b]ut not a matter of personal or partisan politics."' The
coherence and intelligibility of law and lawyering are inextricably implicated in the
contingent world of political values and ethical stances. The law never simply is and
lawyering is never completely the passive and technical involvement in that is. Choice,
and responsibility for those choices, are part and parcel of lawyering. Moreover, there
is a certain disingenuity to lawyers' claims about the given nature of law. Once out of
their apologist stance, it is hard to find a lawyer who actually proceeds on the basis that
the law is fixed, certain and determinate. Sophisticated (and unsophisticated) lawyers
recognize that the chance of success of most cases is attributable to more than the
capacity of the opposing lawyer or presiding judge to get the law wrong: it is as much
about the arguments made and the surrounding circumstances as anything else. If
anybody doubted that, one only has to think what has happened under the Charter9 and
the trajectory of resulting constitutional doctrine.o
In light of the empowered role and elevated status of lawyers in society, the lawyer-
as-hired-hand image is a very humble representation of what lawyers do and what
people experience in their dealings with lawyers. For instance, it is fairly obvious that
lawyers pick their clients indirectly through the fees that they charge. It is not that
lawyers openly pick between competing clients but that only certain kinds of clients
come into certain kinds of law offices: Imasco is not shopping around at the local mall
for an affordable or available lawyer. There is nothing necessarily wrong with charging
substantial fees for services, but the reality of high and variable legal fees confounds
the claims of the lawyer-as-hired-hand image in this regard. Again, it is an unreal
assumption to imagine that most clients, powerful and powerless, come to lawyers with
anything but the most rudimentary notion of what they want and what is in their best
interests. Indeed, it is often for the very reason of clarifying what those interests and
values might be that brings some clients to lawyers in the first place.
A particular fallacy contained within the image of the lawyer-as-hired-hand is the
belief that legal practice is much the same for those who serve disenfranchised people
and those who work for more privileged clients; it is simply a matter of following
different existing rules. Not only is access to legal services obviously disparate, the
needs of the poor require a very different kind of lawyering. Treating all clients the
R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [hereinafter the Charter].
0 See A. Hutchinson, Waiting For Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1995).
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same will do little to alleviate the situation of poorer people. Unlike more privileged
people, their problems are continuing and systemic rather than sporadic and particular;
legal problems do not arise in the otherwise smooth course of their life, but constitute
and define much of that life. Whereas advantaged clients want their lawyers to use the
system to remedy a discrete conflict, disenfranchised clients want their lawyers to
change the system so that they can escape life's continual round of legal difficulties and
bureaucratic hassles." Apolitical engagement in social struggles through law is a
luxury that poverty lawyers and their clients cannot afford.
Finally, the insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate
lawyers in any political process or demand a commitment to any particular ideology is
as weak as it is wilful. Such an image is a profoundly conservative and crude
understanding of what it is to engage in the business of courts, legislatures and the like:
it accepts and works within the bounds of the status quo. Lawyers tend to confuse legal
justice with social fairness. Indeed, the power and prestige of lawyers flows from their
professional allegiance to the state's official laws and existing institutions; lawyers are
the enlisted custodians of the status quo. By pretending otherwise and renouncing
responsibility for the system that their actions hold in place, lawyers are able to
maintain their so-called independence and political authority. As well as being a very
misleading account of lawyering, the image of lawyer-as-hired-hand is an impoverished
vision of the part that lawyers can and do play in the establishment of a substantively
just society.
III. IMPROVING ON THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
Of course, dissatisfaction with the dubious assumptions and limited aspirations of the
traditional image has led some lawyers to develop an alternative vision of lawyering,
inspired by the Realist critique of law. It seeks to provide a better theoretical
framework within which the practice of law can attempt to redeem the ideal of
lawyering as a noble profession that places the needs of popular justice above the
demands of institutional allegiance. While there is much nostalgic thinking behind this
ambition, the belief that lawyers do more than simply seek enforcement of the law, and
might occasionally turn the law to just ends, is a worthwhile and obvious improvement
on the traditional image of the lawyer-as-hired-hand.
The controlling idea behind this image of the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner is the
acceptance that law is not nearly so determinate, objective and stable as formalists
maintain. 2 Litigation and adjudication are much more value-laden and result-oriented
than traditionalists suppose. Consequently, lawyers must take an appropriate share of
the responsibility for those values and results. As players in the system, lawyers must
be prepared not only to take credit for the good, but also to take blame for the bad. At
the very least, they must engage in the struggle to make the legal process the best that
it can be for the benefit of those who live under its directives, particularly the
disadvantaged and the disenfranchised. As much as lawyers are officers of the law, they
1 See D.B. Wexler, "Practicing Law For Poor People" (1970) 79 Yale L.J. 1049.
12 See R.W. Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev, 57.
are also agents of the people; they ought not to uphold the law for its own sake, but
must commit themselves to achieving justice through law. Lawyers should represent
only those clients and causes that contribute to the furtherance of the common good.
In this sense, lawyers are entitled and expected to straddle the roles of private partisan
and public regulator. This does not mean that they should do (or not do) entirely as
they please: lawyers must still obey "a general command to uphold the public purposes
of legal rules"'3 at the same time that they constantly challenge or uphold those rules
to the extent of their consonance with the highest substantive ideals of a truly
democratic polity.
Accordingly, rather than view lawyers as stoic mediators between "the determinate,
articulated interests of a client and the determinate, articulated constraints of a legal or
social system," 4 this realist-inspired critique considers it better to view them as
creative constitutors who work the indeterminate relation between lawyers and clients
to progressive effect. In doing this, lawyers are entitled to retain their own sense of
autonomy in their relations with clients and to exercise their own ethical judgment as
to the best course to follow. While not acting regardless of clients' wishes, clients
represent an opportunity for lawyers to fulfil their own agenda of civic struggle and so
lawyers ought only to take clients and adopt strategies compatible with that agenda. In
a manner of speaking, lawyers and clients must be at one and form a team, with
lawyers prepared to treat the case as if it were their own.
While the basis for this image of the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner is to move beyond
the restricting confines of the lawyer-as-hired-hand and its formalistic underpinnings,
it is a rather muted and only partial improvement. Although this realist image of
lawyering recognizes that there is considerable indeterminacy throughout the legal
process and that political involvement is virtually unavoidable, it does so in what is
ultimately a weak and moderate way. Fearing that anything stronger and more
uncompromising might result in "argumentative nihilism," 's proponents hedge on the
ramifications of accepting the incorrigible indeterminacy of law. They remain
committed to a fairly traditional law-centred approach to social change and political
struggle, in which it is generally thought important to respect the law's procedures and
"to forego actions that would reduce its efficacy." 6 Accordingly, for the lawyer-as-
civic-campaigner, uncertainty and choice are marginal and manageable features of the
legal craft rather than debilitating threats to the very core of continued practice: law is
as much part of the solution as it is part of the problem. There is a sufficient degree of
operational efficacy to satisfy the need for professional self-respect and to refute
criticisms of ideological illegitimacy. Despite intellectual protestations and critical tone,
the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner is still a member of the "Rule of Law" family.
'. D.B. Wilkins, "Legal Realism For Lawyers" (1990) 104 Harv. L. Rev. 468 at 498. See also D.B.
Wilkins, "Who Should Regulate Lawyers?" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 799.
'4 W.H. Simon, "Visions of Practice in Legal Thought" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 469. See also W.H.
Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering" (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083.
" Wilkins, "Legal Realism for Lawyers," supra note 13 at 484.
16 Simon, "Discretion" supra note 14 at 1098.
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In their zeal to escape the false modesty and political indifference of the lawyer-as-
hired-hand's image, the defenders of the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner's image seem to
have jumped out of the frying pan into the fire. Eager to take more responsibility for
what lawyers do, they have allowed the interests of lawyers to again eclipse the needs
of clients. Both the lawyer-as-hired-hand and the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner fail to
connect properly with clients. Whereas the former claims to accept clients' values and
agenda at face value, the latter submerges them under the lawyer's own values and
agenda. Although defended in the name of the common good and democratic
empowerment, the image of the lawyer-as-civic-campaigner makes clients captive to
one more elite cult of expertise, which claims to know what is best for clients and
everyone else. On the road to civic redemption, lawyers are the drivers; clients can only
take a back seat and enjoy the ride. Lawyers decide who is deserving of access to legal
services and representation, what is best for those people taken on, and how their
interests should be furthered. This is aristocratic rule masquerading as popular justice.
No matter how enlightened or well-intentioned, this way of proceeding is
paternalistic and patronizing: it glorifies lawyers individually at the expense of people
generally. Rather than demystifying the allure of the legal system and reducing the
power of lawyers, the image of lawyer-as-civic-campaigner actually increases law's
prestige and lawyers' importance. For instance, the integrationist impetus of much
American civil rights litigation of the 60s and 70s failed to respect the political
demands of blacks for local schools over which black communities could exercise some
control: the lawyers' visions overwhelmed and took precedence over the clients'. 7
While lawyers may well have a role to play in the struggle for greater social justice,
it is a much more humble and much less presumptuous one. Instead of succumbing to
the urge to become authority figures, thus turning the lawyer-client relationship into an
occasion for moral education, lawyers might attempt to nurture a political dialogue in
which both lawyers and clients can share, learn and change; one from which some
mutually viable way of proceeding - albeit not anything as pretentious or preposterous
as the right thing to do - might emerge. In this vision of lawyering, lawyers would
not be merely mouthpieces for their clients' views, nor would they use their clients as
soapboxes for their own preferred causes. The ambition would be to establish the
lawyer-client relationship as a conversational microcosm of democratic culture
involving two. citizens, both able and entitled to contribute fully. This is the key to re-
thinking the shift from traditional images of lawyering to a more postmodern approach
to the role and possibilities of lawyers.
IV. THE LAWYER AS A LOST CAUSE
Before sketching in the shape and substance of postmodern lawyering, there is one
other view of lawyering that has to be considered. I hesitate to call this an image of
lawyering, because it actually maintains that legal practice is almost always a lost cause
by the measure of all truly progressive politics: it is not possible to be a lawyer and to
be politically progressive. Radical lawyering is an oxymoronic pursuit of the first order.
17 See D. Bell, "Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation" (1976) 85 Yale L.J. 479.
This unmitigated critique of the legal profession takes its lead, in a manner of speaking,
from Shakespeare's Dick: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."' The law
is basically a corrupt enterprise, in cahoots with all kinds of public and private interests
to preserve the status quo. Lawyers are major sub-contractors in the capitalist enterprise
of maintaining class relations; their professional ideology and action help to constitute
and hold in place social relations and official institutions. The real bargain between
lawyers and clients is not one of trust and autonomy, but one in which many lawyers
are willing (and eager) to sell themselves and their consciences to the highest bidder.
For such critics, the very reasons that gave rise to law and rights' original appeal have
become the source of their contemporary failure as a program for progressive change:
universalistic pretensions, unyielding individualism, social insensitivity and pervasive
blindness to history.
Involvement with the legal system is co-optive because any resort to law or the
courts for political relief reinforces the legitimacy of the very system which sustains the
oppression in people's lives. Any victories are quickly neutralized by bureaucratic
inertia, political intransigence and judicial complacency. Hard-won litigation victories
have had only negligible effects on providing better health care, education, housing,
employment, and other substantive changes in people's material lives. 9 As Canada's
relatively brief experience with the Charter shows, even the most progressively-inspired
successful litigation is more likely than not to result in weapons for future struggles
being handed to better-resourced enemies of radical change. The history of social
struggle suggests strongly that the prospect of significant social change through
litigation is "a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will."2"
Accordingly, whether as a categoric system of political practice or as a contingent
strategy of radical intervention, law and lawyering can never be productive of real or
lasting social and economic improvement.
Many people will identify much of my work with this kind of generalizing and
dismissive critique of law and lawyers. Undoubtedly, I have written pieces that
contribute to such a genre of scholarship.2 Nevertheless, I have begun to reconsider
some aspects of that stance in recent years. This is not to say that I have rejected many
of the main contentions of such a critique. I still maintain that the routine resort to
courts is profoundly mistaken: it dissipates large amounts of scarce radical energy, it
fails to involve citizens as democratic participants in the process of change, and it has
a very limited and limiting effect on social change. Yet this line of argument has a
tendency to become too polarized, too blunt and too unrealistic in both its critical
IB W. Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 2, in A. Harbage, ed., William Shakespeare: The Complete Works
(New York: Viking Penguin, 1977), Act IV, sc. ii, I. 70.
19 See D. Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (New York: Basic
Books, 1987) at 25-74, 140-61 and 215-35; and J.C. Boger, "Race and The American City: The
Kemer Commission in Retrospect - An Introduction" (1993) 71 N.C.L. Rev. 1289,
20 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 at 186 (1941), Jackson J. For a fuller exploration of these
claims, see A. Hutchinson, "Les Miserables Redux: Law and The Poor" (1993) 2 S. Cal. Interdisc.
L.J. 301 at 326-31.
21 See e.g. A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays on Modern Legal Thought
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
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analysis and political recommendations. In the same way that it is no longer possible
to invoke "material interests" or "class analysis" as the decisive ploy in political
argument, forswearing engagement in law or lawyering entirely is not a viable or
responsible tactic.22 Like the abstract instincts and intimations of the traditional image
of lawyering, the reductionist politics of class struggle fail to sufficiently respect
differences of race, gender and sexuality in its totalizing march to social justice. Such
a radical campaign can too easily fall victim to the same kind of universalistic judgment
that afflicts the lawyer-as-hired-hand's all-or-nothing embrace of litigation as a political
way of life.
On the legal front, the debilitating problem with this critique is that, ironically, it is
based on a very formalistic understanding of law and society - stable, determinate and
objective - that shares much with the traditional image of the lawyer-as-hired-hand
and its jurisprudential footings. The major difference, of course, is that radical critics
reject the substantive values that such a legal process represents and enforces; what
traditionalists treat as just, these critics see as oppressive. The political danger of the
old-style left is that, as well as overestimating the "thereness" of law, they
underestimate the transformative impact that individual agents and legal interventions
can have. 3 Law is much more indeterminate and, therefore, manipulable than either
traditionalists or their critics appreciate. While it is crucial not to exaggerate the
contributions of the court, it is equally important not to deny entirely the possibility that
legal forums can contribute to transformative struggle. Lawyers are not always and not
only "the goon squad of the ruling class.",
24
Consequently, although I accept that the commitment to a Rule of Law mentality has
actually betrayed the cause of democratic governance and egalitarian justice,2" I
concede that it is not possible or desirable to completely ignore lawyers and litigation
in a society so thoroughly pervaded by law and lawyers. While both the wholesale
adoption and rejection of litigation as a schematic process for substantial social
renovation are fundamental errors, the critical challenge is to move beyond such
political stereotypes and their one-dimensional narratives of transformative action. The
choice is not so stark or binary in the struggle for progressive change and social justice.
Mindful that there is no "outside" from which to work, there may be occasional
strategic advantage in making "inside" resort to the courts in the struggle to advance
the project of progressive justice. It involves the precarious but unavoidable task of
trying to tread a thin line between engaging with the system and being co-opted by that
system. The only other choices are to withdraw entirely and wail in the wilderness or
22 See M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Wall & Thompson, 1994) and J. Fudge & H.J. Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A Politics With
Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. and Legal St. 45.
23 See R. Nelson & D.M. Trubek, "New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal
Profession" in R. Abel et al., eds., Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the
American Legal Profession (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) 22.
24 D.A. Price, "Taking Rights Cynically: A Review of Critical Legal Studies" (1989) 48 Camb. L.J.
271. See also P. Macklem, "Of Texts and Democratic Narratives" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 639.
25 See A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan, "Democracy and The Rule of Law" in A. Hutchinson & P.
Monahan, eds., The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 97.
[VOL. XXXIII, NO. 4 1995]
to go underground and foment bloody revolution. Neither of these seem attractive or
tenable solutions in Canada today.
V. A POSTMODERN WAY OF PROCEEDING
So what do I offer in place of these three discredited versions of lawyering?
Although I hesitate to use labels, I want to offer an idea of what a postmodern vision
of lawyering might look like. Or, more accurately, I want to suggest what lawyers
might think about themselves, the system in which they work and the moves that they
would make if they had a postmodern way of thinking. In doing this, my aim is not
simply to colonize the middle ground between the cultivated professional neutrality of
the lawyer-as-hired-hand and the imposed political viewpoint of the lawyer-as-civic-
campaigner. Instead, I want to get beyond this polarized and dichotomous way of
proceeding. Nor do I want to take off on some flight of juristic fantasy and boldly go
where no one would care to go in a misguided attempt to redeem the dubious ideal of
"justice through law." I want to situate a vision of postmodern lawyering in the here-
and-now. The ambition is not mild reform or wild revolution, but a vigorous practice
of transformation and transgression. In the familiar imagery of Neurath's nautical
metaphor,26 the legal profession is already well launched on the historical sea and
unable or unwilling to return to the dry-dock for a complete overhaul. If change is to
be effective, it must be made one plank at a time and while the ship is still at sea.
The most crucial injunction of postmodemism is, as the French theorist Lyotard put
it, that there should be an "incredulity towards meta-narratives." 27 Contary to the
universalistic pretensions of both traditionalists and radicals, there is no one simple and
straightforward account that can be given of the legal process which is cogent or valid
as an accurate description of what goes on, or is a reliable prescription of how to
change it. The only constants about law, society and their interaction are their
messiness and contingency. They are in a constant state of flux and any theoretical
attempt to favour one explanation of the role of the lawyer is doomed to failure. The
theory and practice of law are indeterminately political and politically indeterminate.
There is no non-political stance to practicing or theorizing about law; all claims to
neutrality are premised on an often undisclosed and usually unnoticed set of
controversial normative commitments. Postmodern lawyers will not resist or hedge on
this enduring indeterminacy and inescapable politics, but learn to accept and utilize it
for progressive ends.
At different times and in different ways, the lawyer must be prepared to adopt a
variety of strategies and interventions. Most importantly, lawyers and scholars
committed to progressive action in a postmodern world must resist the temptation to
seek theoretical closure and practical dogma. They must decline the familiar litany of
easy answers in favour of a more challenging slate of better and different questions:
26 See 0. Neurath, "Protocol Sentences" in A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism (Glenecoe: Free Press,
1959).
27 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington & B.
Massurni (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
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"we have learned the answers, all the answers: it is the question that we do not
know. '2 1 Closure is always contrived, frequently arbitrary and usually conducive to
established power relations. Obsessed with elucidating correct and final answers,
progressive scholars often forget that the agenda of questions to be answered is
constantly changing. Justice is not a matter of revelation, and progress is not a slow
march to a promised land always around the next historical bend. In a postmodern
world, justice is less obvious and living is more immediate and engaged. Importantly,
a postmodern critique is neither apocalyptic nor visionary. It is a constant interrogation
and calling into question of all those ideas and practices most familiar to us. It is not
possible to make a clean break from inherited tradition and "one risks ceaselessly
confirming ... that which one allegedly deconstructs."" 9 However, while there are
always and already parameters to action, those boundaries must also be part of the
struggle: contact and situation is not the same as complicity and satiation. The
challenge is to condemn unfailingly the injustices of the present system, but at the same
time, to affirm constantly the possibilities for transformation; to be a deconstructive
pessimist and a reconstructive optimist.
Liberals and radicals alike are correct in thinking that my constructive proposals
cannot guarantee a politics that will be uniformly progressive or whose practice will be
consistently effective. But, to think otherwise is to continue in the belief that the
establishment of foundational truths is possible and can ground a radical political
praxis. The perceived need that people have for such solid ground under their
metaphysical feet is an effect of traditional theory's mistaken insistence that, once fixed,
Truth, History or Right will guide and insulate action from error. Disabused of such
traditional metaphysical yearnings, people will begin to understand that politics is
inside, not outside, of History's suzerainty. A program of progressive politics must
constantly be negotiated and renegotiated. What is progressive can never be determined
in advance or in the abstract; such assessment can only be made with attention to the
local conditions and prevailing exigencies of the situation. All the critic can do is open
spaces for action and increase opportunities for transformation, but he or she cannot fill
those spaces. Whether these openings become holes to fall down or climb out of is left
to those minded to act. Citizenship in a postmodern polity is not a received status, but
is a continuing responsibility to make the best of the situation for oneself and for
others.
All that a postmodern mentality can do is show that power is never apart from
reason. Logic and ambiguity, authority and arbitrariness, and universality and
contingency are implicated in each other. By leaving the risks and responsibility of
reconstruction with real people in real situations, what is good politics or best for the
community will always remain contestable. There is no guarantee against tyranny;
nothing can deliver us from that. While there must be talk of a dawn of egalitarianism,
28 A. MacLeish, The Hamlet of Archibald MacLeish (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928).
29 J. Derrida, "The Ends of Man" in J. Derrida, ed., The Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1982). See also J. Derrida, "Deconstruction and The Other" in R. Kearney, ed.,
Dialogues With Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1984).
there are many who still live in the dusk and darkness of oppression." No theoretical
standpoint can alone ensure that the long night's journey into light can be accomplished
without struggle, mistakes and further pain. The challenge and trick for radical critics
is to nurture and develop those talents and sensibilities that will better attune them to
the nuances and vulnerabilities of structural settings and local contexts. Relieved of the
anxiety to craft solutions somehow apt for all times and places, they will be able to
concentrate on the pressing problems of contemporary Canadian society, and
experiment with interventions that can best address the prevailing institutional structures
of power.
Nevertheless, a postmodern temper is not silent on what might generally amount to
a progressive politics. Postmodernism implies a participatory democracy that is
egalitarian and pluralist, in order to inspire the robust kind of institutional arrangements
that will permit the articulation and antagonism of different modes of life. Of course,
the question of what best serves and advances the idea of democratic practice is
constantly open to interrogation. In a democracy, "bad" forces might carry the day, but
only the day: tomorrow is always another day and another occasion to engage and
transform democracy and its contingent experience. Such a commitment demands the
mobilization of popular energies rather than the application of pseudo-expert
knowledge. Poor lawyering must, therefore, be itself a focus and forum for democratic
engagement where politics is open and judgment is contingent. As occasion for
resistance through empowerment, lawyering must remain piecemeal, situated,
responsible and humble. Ambivalence and doubt are not only inescapable features of
postmodern lawyering, but desirable aspects of it. Without doubt and ambivalence, the
temptation to hubris is all too irresistible.
VI. A RECONSTRUCTED VISION OF POSTMODERN LAWYERING
The first imperative is that, if legal practice is to be transformative, legal practice
itself must first be transformed. At present, lawyering does not march to the beat of the
client's drum, but to the organizational imperatives of the legal profession. This is
effected in myriad ways, and exploring possible means of transformation - loss of
monopoly and self-regulation, socialized legal services, etc. - is well beyond the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, there are three primary obstacles to the realization of a truly
radical legal practice: lawyers are trained to see law and its institutions as just and
necessary structures; there is a professional discipline of political neutrality; and the
social organization of the profession and its continuing lack of real diversity in
membership marginalize any alternative or challenging modes of lawyering. 3" This
will require changes not only in the legal profession, but also in the way legal
education is carried out; law schools and the professorate must accept their share of the
blame for the profession's continuing state of affairs.
10 See H.L. Gates, "Statistical Stigmata" (1990) II Cardozo L. Rev. 1275 at 1289,
31 See S. Scheingold, "The Contradictions of Radical Law Practice" in M. Cain & C. Harrington,
eds., Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (New York: New York
University Press, 1994) 265.
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As part of this overhaul, a very important initiative will be to institutionalize and
accelerate the diversification of the legal profession. Instead of paying lip service to the
idea, there must be aggressive and sustained efforts to open up the legal profession to
the many different groups that presently face significant barriers to entry. Indeed, some
of those changes have already taken place and it is for the profession's ruling bodies
-and establishment to recognize and accommodate that fact. It is already impossible to
proceed on the basis that there is such an entity as the lawyer, a fungible professional
model that can stand in for and represent the profession. There are many different kinds
of lawyers and ways of lawyering: small firms, large firms, sole practitioners, urban
practices, rural practices, generalist firms, specialist firms, female firms, ethnic firms,
etc. It flouts social reality to pretend that legal regulation or instruction can be based
upon anything but pluralist and multiple visions of legal practice.
Of course, in spite of the diversity in forms of business organization and delivery of
legal services, the legal profession is still a bastion of privilege and elitism that is
largely populated and dominated by white, middle-aged men of old European stock. In
the same way that the cultural and ethnic diversity of Canada has changed, so must the
legal profession reorganize itself to reflect this postmodern fact of social living. It is
not, as John Major puts it, that there are "special" groups and societies whose interests
must be recognized and whose members must be absorbed into the legal profession.32
The only "special" group in the Canadian legal profession is the one that has controlled
its affairs and self-image for decades. Effective transformation will only occur when
that group is willing or obliged to relinquish its hold on power. The only real changes
in the system will come when the composition, demographics and, therefore, life-
experience of lawyers change and their different views of what it is to be a lawyer are
not just tolerated, but displace or transform the regnant images nurtured by the
dominant group in society and falsely heralded as neutral in operation and design.
On the personal front, the most radical move would be to urge lawyers to take
individual responsibility for what they say and do in their professional capacities. By
rejecting the hackneyed and unsustainable notion of an entirely differentiated role,
lawyers might begin to gain the respect of the public and themselves. In the same way
that good oratory is a good person speaking well,33 good lawyering is a good person
acting well. As trivial and trite as this may seem, it is the best advice that can be given
to the fledgling lawyer and the most compelling injunction to the jaded lawyer. It offers
no magical guide as to what to do in any specific or conflicted situation, because there
is none to be given. It is for each person to arrive at an informed and conscientious
decision in accordance with their own political and moral lights. The objective is not
to chastize lawyers simply because they are corporate lawyers or represent rapists and
bigots: it is to encourage each lawyer to take responsibility for the clients they take, the
causes they fight for and the tactics they use. In doing so, however, the postmodern
lawyer will ensure that those moral and political lights are always brought into play and
are themselves open to debate and re-consideration. In the postmodern play-book, the
32 J.C. Major, "Lawyers' Obligation to Provide Legal Services" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 719 at 728.
33 See Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, trans. H.E. Butler (London: W. Heinemann, 1921) Book Xll,
i.1 at 355 [paraphrased].
goal is not an enforced and impersonal orthodoxy, but a respectful and responsible
heterodoxy.
The directive to lawyers to take responsibility for what they do (and omit to do)
ought not to be viewed as an excuse for ignoring the needs of clients, or for taking
control of a legal case in the same way as realist critics openly defend and
traditionalists covertly effect. The recommendation is to be neither the clients'
unquestioning servant nor their know-all master. Instead, lawyers and clients are to
work toward a non-hierarchical relationship that is premised on the fact that they both
have something to contribute - the lawyer's insider knowledge and the client's
outsider perspective - to the joint enterprise in which they are equally, if differently,
engaged. An important distinction here is between lawyers' personal sets of substantive
values and the more general constraints of their moral convictions. Postmodern lawyers
will not foist their own values on the client, but neither will they work with clients in
ways that offend their moral convictions. The lawyer-client relationship should be
mutually respectful and engaged.
Also, in assuming responsibility, it is important that lawyers look beyond their
dealings with their own clients. Part of any mature understanding of what amounts to
responsible behaviour will include in its moral almanac the belief that one should do
as little harm as possible.34 Although it will make life much more complicated, it is
incumbent on postmodern lawyers to weigh the effects of their actions on other people
and the harm that will ensue. This is to say little more than that society has a stake in
the legal profession's actions and this should be accepted by lawyers. Again, this is a
matter in which there is no magic formula: every lawyer will have very different views
about the weight to be attached to different considerations and how they are to be
weighed against the obligation to their clients and themselves. Contrary to popular
misconceptions, a portrait of postmodern lawyering is not painted exclusively in the
familiar shades of moral grey: it is a living video filmed in bold and bright colours,
whose edges are constantly blurred and whose contrast is continually shifting.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF LAW
The claim that law is eternally and inescapably political has profound implications
for all lawyers. As well as undermining the mainstream jurisprudential project and its
images of lawyering, it obliges postmodern critics to take seriously the legal process
as a formative constituent of social life and as an important arena for political struggle.
This does not mean a lemming-like rush into the courts nor an unconditional embrace
of the Rule of Law: these responses are more suited to the born-again jurisprudential
zealot than the progressive sceptic. The belief that there will either be a complete
absence of law or a positivistic form of democratic law in a transformed world are both
dangerous fantasies. A transformative view of law demands more than a facile pouring
of new wine into old institutional bottles of liberal formalism, or a mere change in the
34 I am grateful to Richard Devlin for pointing out to me the importance of this moral axiom for a
postmodern view of lawyering. See R. Devlin, "Normative, and Somewhere to Go? Reflections
on Professional Responsibility" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 924.
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personnel of the state. It requires a critical understanding of the political nature of legal
structures, their instrumental limitations and their resistance to accommodating change.
In short, a constitutive theory of law, infused by a sense of historical indeterminacy and
political contingency, can be conducive to the ambitions of progressive lawyering and
can best guard against "the slide into reformism or cynicism."3
Accordingly, progressive scholars must look for better and different ways to
empower disadvantaged groups. In effecting such a proposal, two actions must be
taken. The first step is to raise the critical consciousness of lawyers by disabusing them
of their ingrained habit of resorting to the courts as the transformative forum of choice.
They must become more sensitive to the debilitating effect of extended involvement of
courts in civic life. Litigation and adjudication are special social activities that do not
so much cause or condition, but comprise and are constitutive of extant social
conditions. As such, it is dangerously naive and overly romantic to contend that court-
enforced rights can, will or should be the preferred medium for social activists.
Litigation has a distinct tendency to present clients as victims in need of help, rather
than as survivors claiming their rightful share of power. 6 It is a self-serving conceit
for lawyers to encourage the continued use of litigation as a constructive and viable
route to social justice. The language of the law has very often been and continues to
be the language of the poor's subjection and misery. Not only is it difficult, as a
practical and instrumental matter, to challenge subordination within and through the
very institutions that subordinate people, but there is also the political and ideological
grip that judicial discourse places on its participants: "the legal forms we use set limits
on what we can imagine as practical outcomes." 17
Ultimately, any gain achieved through litigation will serve to lend popular credence
to the legal system as a legitimate arena for successful transformative activism. To
engender respect for any right gained and to ensure their effective enforcement, it will
be necessary to instill a general reverence for the courts as a whole. In this, the radical
critics are undoubtedly right.38 While such a strategy might allow small advances to
be made, it will actually defer and inhibit the kind of profound changes necessary for
truly progressive transformation; minor improvements are the obstacles, not the
precursors to major innovation. Being abstract and potentially universalistic, rights-talk
has no required political content and application: rights-talk is a site for struggle and
occupation, not a completed project. Consequently, any right can be ambushed and held
hostage by non-progressive lawyers, and turned to the advantage of their own
(privileged) clientele. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened in Canada. In the first
three years after the introduction of the Charter's equality provision (s. 15), there were
approximately 600 judicial considerations of the section, of which forty-four decisions,
" K.E. Klare, "Law-Making As Praxis" (1979) 40 Telos 135.
36 See K. Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988).
. Gordon, supra note 12 at I11.
" See H.J. Glasbeek, "Some Strategies For an Unlikely Task: The Progressive Use of Law" (1989)
21 Ottawa L. Rev. 387 at 396.
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or 7 percent, involved sexual equality.39 Most alarmingly, only seven of these cases
were initiated by or on behalf of women; the other thirty-seven decisions were based
on claims by men. Moreover, while obvious and important gains have been made
through Charter litigation, they have tended to expand notions of due process and
natural justice; they have not strengthened the arm of the oppressed to challenge or
dislodge the elite brokers of established power.
Secondly, imbued with an appropriate sense of critical consciousness, progressive
lawyers should develop a self-conscious program of strategic scepticism. Mindful that
the details and priorities of a progressive politics must be the continuing subject of
healthy debate and respectful disagreement, such a program would be more the
cultivation -of a particular mind-set and the refinement of various tactical techniques
than the establishment of a manifesto of litigable claims. The core idea is to act in a
guerrilla-like way: within a broad set of progressive objectives, to seize the possibilities
of any contingent moment, in order to achieve judicial decisions that heighten the status
quo's contradictions and open up space for lasting political action. Of course, the fact
is that many of the disadvantaged and disenfranchised are not accorded the privilege
of choosing the institutional site or rhetorical conditions of their struggle for social
transformation. Nevertheless, this is not as significant nor as debilitating as might first
be thought. The first step to enlightenment is the recognition that there is no available
"outside" from which to engage in transformative action: all struggle is already situated
within the mechanisms that must be resisted and reworked. The struggle must
commence from where we are, with the historical problems and possibilities of the
present. The only available strategy is to develop legal tactics that politicize and disrupt
the courts in the process of using them for litigation.4" The challenge is to engage in
law and, at the same time, to delegitimate it by eschewing abstract notions of justice
and rights in favour of concrete and individual, site-specific challenges.
As well as perpetuating the idea that justice comes from a judicial act of noblesse
oblige rather than being a product forged at the anvil of social struggle, dependence on
litigation struggles over rights will dissipate much valuable energy that could be better
used elsewhere. Direct citizen involvement is always to be preferred to litigation. At
the heart of any progressive campaign for social justice, there must be a firm
commitment to the development of popular coalitions - so that the disenfranchised can
become part of their own empowerment.
39 G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step Forward or Two
Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989). Instead of being
necessarily about the equality concerns of the disadvantaged, the equality provision has been used
to deal with issues such as drunk driving and the manufacture of pop cans. See Mandel, supra note
22. Nevertheless, Brodsky & Day still believe that the problem has been primarily doctrinal. For
a sceptical critique, see J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities and Limitations
to The Use of Charter Litigation in Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485;
and B. Cossman, "Dancing In The Dark" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 223.
40 For a transgressive rather than conformist approach to law practice, see P. Gabel & A. Harris,
"Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law" (1983) 11
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 369; and C. Smart, "Feminism and Law: Some Problems of Analysis and
Strategy" (1989) Int. J. Soc. L. 109.
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If a true democracy is to be the goal, it must be effected by means that are
themselves thoroughly democratic in nature. For instance, in responding to the plight
of the homeless, those very people can be involved as paid consultants and workers in
the planning and (re)building of affordable housing and public amenities so that, once
such homes are created, they might be able to pay their way in their co-operative
management and maintenance.
The shift from a less individual-centred and rights-based approach to a more group-
based and power-oriented program will facilitate this ambition. In this way, it might
become possible to "recognize and accommodate the political importance of process
over legal goals and build links with communities whose perspectives..." are not usually
or easily represented in the jejune practices of litigation.4 Apart from abjuring the
tendency toward litigation, the lawyer has an important role to play in such a program.
While it will involve a re-orientation of what is traditionally understood to be the
primary skills of lawyering, a revised legal practice will still call upon many of the
peculiar talents of lawyers for sophisticated organization and sound planning. Even the
model of the good corporate lawyer can be appropriated and given a community-based
twist; lawyers could seek to do less fire-fighting and more pre-emptive planning. In
facilitating the establishment of community institutions and infra-structure, lawyers can
enhance a co-operative's capacity to make informed decisions about its own
development and activities; they can nurture a democratic culture and organizational
structure that meets the need and wishes of its members.42 In this way, the lawyer
becomes a public contributor to, rather than a private adversary of, the civic
community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although I have been very down on the profession, I still believe that if there is to
be change, it must come as much through the legal profession as in spite of it. It is
those relatively few committed and concerned members that will have to bear the
leonine share of responsibility for pulling it out of its ovine situation. In order to do
that, lawyers must be prepared to abandon the habits of a lifetime and speak "truth to
power." Rather than rest snug in power's comfort and privileges, they must risk the
anger and rejection of the establishment. The profession must serve citizens at large and
not themselves. In doing this, lawyers will accept such an obligation as a matter of
civic trust, not as an exceptional act of charity or, as John Major seemed to be
suggesting, a good business move.4" The last thing that lawyers need to do is to
resurrect a vision of lawyering that draws on the aristocratic language of noblesse
41 S. Razack, Canadian Feminism and the Law. The Women's Legal Education and Action Fund and
The Pursuit of Equality (Toronto: Second Story Feminist Press, 1991) at 57.
42 See E.S. Cahn & J.C. Cahn, "The War On Poverty: A Civilian Perspective" (1964) 73 Yale L.J.
1317; R.C. Slyc, "Community Institution Building" (1991) 36 Viii. L. Rev. 1035; and J.S. Lehman
& R.E. Lento, "Law School Support For Community-Based Economic Development in Low-
Income Urban Neighbourhoods" (1992) 42 Wash. U.J. Urb. 65.
43 See Major, supra note 32. When lawyers talk about doing pro bono work, it suggests either that
they have become fans of U2 or that they spend most of their time doing pro mala work.
oblige. It is no use roaring like the mythical lion, if all we end up doing is bleating like
the proverbial sheep.
As much as a democratic society demands postmodem lawyers, a postmodern society
needs postmodern lawyers. There is no hard truth out there to which lawyers can cling
in the vain hope that it will relieve them of the professional and personal burden of
taking responsibility for what they do. There are just different visions of what we can
be as lawyers, and through which we can try to vindicate ourselves from our actions
as citizens in a civic and postmodern world. As an incorrigible romantic (in a
postmodern sense, of course), I ask you to take seriously Tennyson's Ulyssean
incitement to moral redemption:
Come, my friends,
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world ...
Though much is taken, much abides; and though
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are,
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
Or, as temporary citizens in the city of rodeos and stampedes, we might look forward
and, as far as the transformation of the legal profession is concerned, look back on
"Calgary and Everything After." Like that great postmodernist and film actor Robin
Williams said (by way of Horace's Odes), Carpe Diem.
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